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Closed Borders and Closed Minds: Immigration Policy Changes After 9/11 And U.S. Higher
Education
M. Allison Witt
University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign
Abstract
Amidst the spectacular losses of 9/11 and the tremendous ongoing ramifications of wars, security
overhauls, loss of liberties and freedoms, as well as dire economic consequences, policy shifts
affecting U.S. higher education have occurred quietly, largely unnoticed by the popular press or the
American public, yet the implications for colleges and universities, and the public they serve, are
dramatic and farreaching. Despite the increasing interconnectedness of our world, evident in politics,
economics and the environment, post 9/11 policy changes increasingly isolate U.S. higher education
from the outside world, hampering academic freedom, stifling outside viewpoints, and consequently,
allowing American hegemony an unchallenged stronghold. This paper will discuss the policy changes
affecting nonimmigrant student visas, international research collaborations, and visiting scholar visas
within the historical context of American higher education and within the current debate on
immigration policy in the U.S. Implications for diversity, academic freedom, and the decreasing
potential for diverging views and counterperspectives within academia will be discussed.
Closed Borders and Closed Minds: Immigration Policy Changes after 9/11 and U.S. Higher
Education
Amidst the spectacular losses of 9/11 and the tremendous ongoing ramifications of wars, security
overhauls, loss of liberties and freedoms, as well as dire economic consequences, policy shifts
effecting US higher education have occurred quietly, largely unnoticed by the popular press or the
American public, yet the implications for colleges and universities, and the public they serve, are
dramatic and far reaching. Despite the increasing interconnectedness of our world, evident in politics,
economics and the environment, post 9/11 policy changes increasingly isolate U.S. higher education
from the outside world, hampering academic freedom, stifling outside viewpoints, and consequently,
allowing American hegemony an unchallenged stronghold. This paper will discuss the policy changes
affecting nonimmigrant student visas, international research collaborations and visiting scholar visas
within the historical context of American higher education and within the current debate on
immigration policy in the US. Implications for diversity, academic freedom, and the decreasing
potential for diverging views and counter perspectives within academia will be discussed.
Policy Change
In response to the 9/11 terrorists attacks, President Bush issued a Homeland Security Directive in
October of 2001 calling for measures to end “abuse of student visas” and prevention of “certain
international students from receiving education and training in sensitive areas” (U. S. Office of the
President, 2001, para. 12). This directive came on the heels of the Patriot Act, which had already
called for the full implementation, and even expansion, of the controversial Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
Together these acts set in motion a complete rewriting of immigration policy regarding international
students seeking higher education in the U.S. The terms “certain . . . students” and “abuse of student
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visas were broadly interpreted and widely applied. So broadly, in fact, that all of the more than 550,000
international students who annually enter the United States to begin study were affected, in addition to
all the millions of students currently in degreeseeking status.
When international students were first classified in U.S. immigration law under the Immigration Act of
1924, they were admitted as nonquota immigrants. Since students come for a temporary sojourn and
not for permanent residence, the Immigration Act of 1952 reclassified students as nonimmigrant (Alien
Students, 1980). The underlying assumption was that intending immigrants would use student visas as
a means to enter the country, or would try to stay in the U.S. after the completion of study. The burden
of proof was on each applicant to establish eligibility for this nonimmigrant status by demonstrating
significant ties to the home country in the form of residence, employment goals, or family members
remaining at home. This burden of proof shifted over time to encompass the political goals of the day.
In the Cold War, international students in the U.S. were assumed to be spies. Now, with the recent
passage of the intelligence reform act, they are assumed to be terrorists until they can prove otherwise.
All applicants to U.S. colleges are currently subject to interviews at U.S. consulates abroad where they
will be expected to prove that they are not intending to immigrate and that they are not intending
terrorist action while in the U.S. Even after this interview, all of the international students are now
tracked and monitored throughout their course of study.
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)
Because of the post 9/11 Presidential directive, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS) tracking system was quickly implemented, which resulted in a number of drastic changes in
the immigration process for international applicants, international students, and American universities.
The SEVIS system is an electronic database that universities must use and update, which screens and
tracks every international student applicant and every international student enrolled. For example, to
admit an international student, the university must enter a few pages of detailed data about the student
into the government’s Internetbased database. Then, the university tracks all of the student’s actions
for the government, from entry to and exit of the country, course enrollment, address changes, to even
personal financial information. To meet the January 2003 deadline, universities had to quickly hire and
train employees that could fulfill these secure data entry requirements. Funding and staffing shortages
often required complete restructuring of international admissions offices. In a 2002 hearing before the
Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness, the American Association of State Colleges and
Universities complained of the sudden and ongoing cost to institutions, including “training, software
licenses, staffing and other attendant maintenance” (U.S. Congress, 2002a, pp. 10779,142).
But universities weren’t the only ones scrambling to fulfill the government mandate. The State
Department was also caught understaffed and unprepared to implement the new system. Consular
offices around the world had to immediately institute numerous changes in processing and phase in the
new system. In a 2003 Performance and Accountability Report released by the Bureau of Resource
Management, Consular Affairs was found to be deficient in the “fundamental readjustment regarding
visa issuance” (U.S. Department of State, 2003, Section 1). The Office of Inspector General
recommended, among many other changes, that the department “assess and reallocate consular
workloads worldwide” (U.S. Department of State, 2003, Section 2).
As a consequence of such major internal overhauls within the Consular Affairs offices, international
students were forced to endure long delays in visa issuance. Some students were trapped in their home
country as consular offices transitioned. Yang Wang’s story is typical: Wang, a doctoral student at
Stanford, returned home to China for a three weekvisit to his parents in December 2002. He was
forced to stay for 11 months while Washington conducted a security check on him before issuing his
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol3/iss1/5
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return visa (Zhao, 2004). Xiaomei Jiang, a doctoral student in physics at the University of Utah, rushed
home to China after her parents were killed in a car accident. She was not allowed to return to the U.S.
for nine months, causing her to miss the defense of her thesis (Zhao, 2004). Others waited months and
in some cases years for visa approval to come. And then it didn’t. After waiting, students could still be
denied, and without explanation. Six months after applying, Jane Wang, admitted to Ohio State, heard
that her case had been mysteriously closed, forcing her to reapply and begin the indefinite wait all over
again (Zhao, 2004).
Historical Context
Although the Chinese represent just 11 percent of foreign students in the United States, 57 percent of
serious delays involved Chinese students. Indian and Russian students have also been subject to long
waits. Male students from Arab or Muslim countries make up another large group of delayed
applications, as they are all subject to additional rounds of security checks. This type of monitoring
actually dates back to the 1950’s and escalated throughout the Cold War when the U.S. wanted to
prevent the transfer of technology to Communist countries. However, consulates at that time seldom
scrutinized the backgrounds of students on the scale that is being done today (Zhao, 2004). Still,
foreign students were traditionally viewed as potential agents of espionage throughout the Cold War
era.
In April of 1966, former Senator William Benton addressed the American Academy of Political and
Social Science on the subject of “Education as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” and the speech was
later submitted to the Senate for the record regarding the International Education Act. Benton
delineates the “grim Soviet devotion to education.” The Soviets were accused of a “direct attack” on
America by publishing educational texts in chemistry, biology, engineering and even the U.S. itself.
Further, the U.S.S.R. was encouraging underdeveloped nations to “follow [the Soviet] educational
model” (U.S. Senate, 1966, pp. 5039).
During the Cold War, foreign students from communist countries were all viewed by sectors of the
government as potential, even likely, spies. In a 1988 Department of Defense report, all 15,000
Chinese students in the U.S. at that time were considered potential “hostile intelligence threats.” In
addition, the report documents 60 institutions of higher education that the FBI believed were the
subject of focused Soviet efforts to gather intelligence (U.S. Department of Defense, 1988).
Perhaps one of the most extreme examples of the politicization of international students occurred
during the Carter administration, when U.S. embassy workers were taken hostage in Iran. Iranian
students whose visas had lapsed were ordered deported by President Carter from U.S. higher education
institutions as a retaliatory gesture. At that time, U.S. higher education responded in the traditionally
decentralized manner, with each institution choosing its own response. One institution, Greenville
Technical College in Greenville, S.C., took justice into its own hands and suspended all 104 Iranian
students and told them they could not return until the American hostages were released (Nunes, 1979).
Robert C. Crawford, vice chairman of the state school’s board of regents, boldly stated that the
“punitive action” was “intended that way” and further justified his punishment of innocent Iranian
students by explaining that “there are some innocent people in the U.S. Embassy, too”. The Greenville
Technical College response, however, stands out as an anomaly during the crisis. Most international
educators deplored the President’s order and some universities, such as UCLA and USC, prohibited
immigration service agents from conducting oncampus interviews with Iranian students (Nunes,
1979).
Though the deportations were intended as retaliatory and punitive, the threat of deporting Iranian
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students from the U.S. had no bearing on the final release of the American hostages in Iran. Perhaps
the most lasting impact of the ordered deportation was the precedent it set of using international
students as leverage against terrorist acts.
Even before 9/11, research conducted by and with foreign students and scholars had become the
subject of scrutiny. In fact, by March of 2000, Congress moved the oversight of satellite technology
from the Commerce Department to the State Department, causing all basic research in scientific
satellites, related data, software, and components to be considered military munitions so that
universities were required to apply for export licenses if they wanted to include foreign students or
researchers in related projects. The Association of American Universities lobbied President Clinton
against the change, explaining that the regulations were “having an adverse impact on university
research” (Abel, 2000, para. 11). Eugene Skolnikoff, an MIT professor specializing in technology
transfers complained of the resulting “climate of fear,” for academics, many who feared “prosecution
for even the unintentional transfer of unclassified data, such as in a phone conversation, with scientists
from blacklisted countries, including China, Taiwan, Israel, Pakistan, and India” (Abel, 2000, para.
9).
The climate of fear surrounding international students and academic exchange that lingered in the post
Cold War era greatly intensified after the policy changes made after 9/11. Of course, the 9/11 attacks
were in no way precipitated by communists or in any way linked to Communism. Moreover, none of
the drastic measures taken to monitor students in the post9/11 era would have had any deterring
effect.
To illustrate, only one of the 19 9/11 hijackers entered the country on a student visa. Hani Hasan
Hanjour, a 26yearold Saudi national, entered the U.S. on a nonimmigrant student visa. He did not,
however, seek an advanced degree at a higher education institution, but instead, entered the country
ostensibly to study English at an ESL Language Center in California (Borjas, 2002). Even if the SEVIS
system had been operable at the time, Hanjour would have presumably been able to do so, though
perhaps with some delay. Since the State Department had no previous record of him in their database
check system, he would likely have been approved for study. He was not currently enrolled in classes
at the time of the attack, so he would have been noted in the SEVIS database as outofstatus for non
attendance, but that would not likely have resulted in any immediate action. In fact, in February of
2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that while the INS removed 92 percent of
deported aliens who were detained, it removed only 13 percent of aliens who were not detained (i.e.,
incarcerated). Moreover, the INS removed only six percent of nondetained aliens with final
deportation papers from countries identified by the U.S. Department of State as sponsors of terrorism
(i.e., Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Saudi
Arabia, the home country for 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers is not on the list. None of the other 18
hijackers of 9/11 entered the country on student visas, so the SEVIS system would not have tracked
them at all.
Nonimmigrant Student and Exchange Visas within the Immigration Debate
Student visas actually make up a small percentage of people entering the United States every year. For
example, in 2001, only 8.2% of nonimmigrant visas were given to students. Visitors for tourism and
business comprised the largest group of nonimmigrant visa holders. The Department of Homeland
Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics reports over 32.8 million entries into the U.S. in 2001
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). An estimated 32.5 million foreignborn people reside
in the U.S., with one million more achieving legal permanent resident status every year. In addition,
between seven and eight million enter the U.S. illegally each year (Wasem, 2003). Clearly, the
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol3/iss1/5
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550,000 entering International students in higher education are by far the most monitored and screened
group of aliens in the country, though they are also one of the smallest groups.
If the implementation of SEVIS could not prevent the “abuse of student visas,” by terrorists, could it
prevent “certain international students from receiving education and training in sensitive areas”? In
May 2002, the State Department sent a memo to all American visa officers, asking them to watch for
applicants whose area of study appeared on the “technology alert list,” or the “sensitive major list”
(Zhao, 2004). The list is another remnant of the Cold War era, in which over 150 concentrations
appear. Again, broad interpretation led to sweeping effects, as “sensitive areas” is expanded to include
topics as seemingly innocuous as urban planning and landscape design. Students from other parts of
the world who have backgrounds in the social sciences or the humanities are not subject to the same
scrutiny, nor are most undergraduate students who have yet to declare majors. Theoretically, then,
anyone could pursue sensitive technology if the study began at the undergraduate level, or if he or she
changed majors after arrival. Again, this would be noted in SEVIS, but not likely acted on by the
Department of Homeland Security.
If the policy shifts could not prevent terrorism, what then, could have been their purpose? If we review
the highly publicized current debate on immigration policy affecting both legal and illegal immigrants,
the contrast of relative silence with regard to nonimmigrant visa policy is striking. By contrasting the
two groups, several key differences emerge. First, nonimmigrant students applying to U.S. universities
must begin the process months and even many years in advance. As anyone who has applied to
universities in the U.S. knows, several tests must be taken, numerous forms must be completed, and
fees must be paid. The applicants, then, are a selfselected group who are willing to take on the
arduous tasks assigned to them by what is often a large bureaucracy, a university admissions office.
Furthermore, they are a group that is as a whole, financially welloff, considering the continually
escalating costs of higher education. Even if the student has received a scholarship or fellowship, the
costs associated with travel and relocation are not insignificant. In short, nonimmigrant student visa
holders are by and large a ruleabiding, financially well off group willing to jump through bureaucratic
hoops to achieve a longterm goal. Therefore, policing them is merely a matter of making rules that
they will then follow. University applicants’ tendency towards compliance makes them an easy target
for regulation.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, they are a small group, hailing from all over the world. They speak
countless languages and come from numerous cultural backgrounds. These variances make it less
likely that they can unite in a voice of protest over changes in immigration policy. Further, as non
immigrants, problems with U.S. visas are a temporary problem for them. They do not expect to
struggle with student visa problems for more than a few years, making the situation one that they tend
to wait out rather than work to change.
For all the above reasons, it is unlikely, then, that students themselves will protest the policy changes,
but what about the universities who have admitted and in many cases, recruited these students from
around the world? Unlike previous government attempts at intervention with international students on
campuses, administrators and educators did not, or could not, resist policy changes. In fact , after 9/11,
the entire landscape of international education in the U.S. shifted dramatically from a posture of
recruitment, to one of determent, from receptive to suspicious, from hospitable to hostile.
Post9/11, university educators and administrators became far more compliant with government
surveillance of international students than they were with past attempts at governmental interference on
campus. Even professional higher education organizations in international education that had formerly
resisted legislation hindering international students submitted to the fear and paranoia of the immediate
post9/11 arena and in some cases, actually came out in tempered support of legislation they had spent
Published by Western CEDAR, 2008
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For example, in April of 2001, The American Council on Education (ACE), a membership
organization of college presidents of 1,800 institutions and 76 other educational and exchange visitor
organizations, sent a letter to the INS rejecting CIPRIS, an earlier prototype of SEVIS, calling its
potential implementation a “looming disaster” for higher education (Southwick, 2001). Terry W.
Hartle, senior vice president for government and public affairs for the ACE, claimed that the program
would “have the effect of closing off options for many foreign students who might want to study in the
U.S.” (Southwick, 2001). College lobbyists accurately predicted that the database, and the fee
collected from students to finance it, would “hurt the enrollment of international students and be an
unfair hardship to those from the poorest countries” (Southwick, 2001). But by September 24, 2002, in
a Joint House Subcommittee hearing, David Ward, President of ACE, called SEVIS “the single most
important step that the federal government can take,” and went on to state that “we strongly support
SEVIS and would like to see it implemented as soon as possible.” Regarding the fee, he complained
that the amount and collection procedure were still unsettled, but did not take issue with the fee itself
or the burden it would create for students (U.S. Congress, 2002b). This dramatic shift in stance
characterizes the post9/11 era in higher education policy and distinguishes it from past attempts to
limit “certain students from receiving higher education.”
Impact of the Policy Change
Now, several years after the sweeping post9/11 immigration changes, U.S. higher education
institutions are down an average of over 30% in international applications (Council of Graduate
Schools, 2004). The decrease spans regions of the world and disciplines within the institutions
themselves, showing a dramatic overall, worldwide decrease in international student interest toward
U.S. colleges and universities (Council of Graduate Schools, 2004). In addition, the number of foreign
students on American campuses “declined [in 2003] by 2.4 percent – the first drop in foreign
enrollment since the 19711972 academic year” (Bollag, 2004). A survey of major graduate
institutions, conducted by the Council of Graduate Schools, found a six percent decline in new foreign
enrollments for the fall semester of 2004, making it the third year in a row with a substantial drop in
new students (Bollag, 2004).
Experts tend to agree on the reasons for the decline, “chiefly the real and perceived difficulties in
obtaining student visas, especially in scientific and technical fields” (Bollag, 2004). According to Nils
Hasselmo, president of the Association of American Universities, "the major factors are U.S. visa
policy, increased international competition and perceptions that the United States is no longer a
welcoming country" (Foreign Grad Students in U.S. Down, 2004).
In fact, at the same moment that the U.S. began to implement the immigration policy changes, other
English speaking countries or nations with English language higher education programs stepped up
their efforts to recruit international students. "Many countries, like the United Kingdom, South Africa,
Germany and Australia are recruiting the same students we are after, and some students are finding
these places more attractive," says Terry W. Hartle, a senior vice president of the ACE (Foreign grad
students in U.S. down, 2004). Indeed, the enrollment of students from China in Australian colleges
grew by 25 percent and students from India by 31 percent last fall, compared with a year ago. In
England, the number of Chinese students grew by 36 percent and Indian students, by 16 percent. “Not
surprisingly, universities in Australia, Britain, France and elsewhere are taking advantage of our
barriers and are aggressively recruiting these students,” writes Robert M. Gates, former director of
Central Intelligence and current President of Texas A&M (2004).
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol3/iss1/5
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While it is tempting to blame all of the decline in international applications to U.S. higher education
institutions on SEVIS and its regulations, researchers had noted that the U.S. has been “losing market
share” since the 1980’s. While the total number of foreign students at U.S. institutions grew throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. continued to slip from about 40 percent of market share in the 1980s to
just 32 percent by 1998 (Panel to Study Whether U.S. Laws and Regulations are Deterring Foreign
Students, 1999). In contrast, other nations were expanding their hold on the international education
market. As early as 1998, Great Britain announced an aggressive, well funded marketing plan, backed
by changes in visa regulations that would make it easier for foreign students to enter and work in the
U.K. The strategy’s stated goal was to attract 75,000 more foreign students (Panel to Study Whether
U.S. Laws and Regulations are Deterring Foreign Students, 1999). This plan is in sharp contrast to the
U.S., where international students were traditionally viewed as a “problem” for the faculty and
institutions (Jenkins, 1983). In fact, “instead of being seen as individuals, foreign students in United
States colleges and universities tended to become identified by their problems and classified under the
generic term ‘foreign student’” (Jenkins, 1983).
Before 9/11, educators within higher education fought this tendency and organized to protect and
encourage foreign students on campuses across the country. As early as the 1980s, experts in the field
of international education bragged that
the persons involved in foreign student affairs are much more effective in dealing with their
responsibilities. Thus, foreign students . . . find that they are no longer treated as a stereotype . . .
but greeted as individuals who bring with them their own cultural heritage, have their own
capabilities, and pursue their own particular goals. (Jenkins, 1983)
After 9/11, however, all international students were again being lumped into one category: terrorists.
The economic implications for the loss of international students to the United States are extensive.
International education ranks as the nation’s fifth largest service sector export, and represents a 13
billion dollar annual industry (Foreign Graduate Students in U.S. Down, 2004). But the economic
impact is only one measure of the loss for the United States. More difficult to quantify, but also more
significant, is the loss in diversity at the student and even the faculty level.
The State Department has expanded its focus on students outward to encompass foreign faculty as
well, most notably in a case in August, 2004, in which Tariq Ramadan, a prominent Muslim scholar
from Switzerland, had his visa revoked just before he was to begin teaching at Notre Dame. The State
Department cited a legal provision that bans anyone “likely to engage in any terrorist activity,” but
scholars at Notre Dame feared instead that it was Mr. Ramadan’s views, “not an extremist discourse
but one that is critical of U.S. policy,” which lead to the decision (Kinzer, 2004). The director of the
Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Scott Appleby, said that he “worr[ied] about the
implications for academic freedom and more generally for freedom of speech. . .” (Kinzer, 2004). Mr.
Ramadan’s case is not unique. Academic and civilliberties groups assert that during the last year or
so, the Bush administration has increased its use of security measures to keep out foreign scholars
whose politics or ideas it does not want the American public to hear: The government typically does
not give a reason for denying the visas, making it nearly impossible to challenge the decision (Bollag,
2007).
Because of the difficulty in obtaining visas to the U.S., international collaborations are being driven
overseas. Research and academicbased conferences, which include, for example, “75 national
academies and 27 scientific unions” from the International Council for Science, are holding their
conferences outside the U.S. to avoid visa delays for participants (Kinzer, 2004). Among the U.S.
based collaborations that have already suffered “is the particle physics project at the Fermi Lab—many
Published by Western CEDAR, 2008
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team members, especially Chinese and Russians, cannot enter the country” (Kinzer, 2004). In one
notable case, Russian physicists enrolled in a training program on safeguarding nuclear weapons were
unable to get visas to attend the class (Chul, 2003).
The resulting isolation for American students and scholars creates a disconnected environment where it
becomes increasingly difficult to clearly view, teach, debate or scrutinize American global dominance
from inside American academic culture. With a limited presence of international students in the
classroom, and with participation in international academic and researchbased collaborations limited,
the dominant American culture is free to fix a common worldview that does not problematize the role
of American culture globally, or consider the global effects of U.S. government policies. As Peter
McLaren points out, “Americans are generally positioned as subjects by dominant discourse” (Darder,
Boltadano & Torres, p. 77). Indeed, he goes on to explain that,
Most Americans would be aghast at hearing a description of their country as a terrorist regime
exercising covert acts of war against Latin American countries such as Nicaragua. The
prevailing image of America that the schools . . . have promulgated is a benevolent one in which
the interests of the dominant classes supposedly represent the interests of all groups. (78)
Such limited viewpoints can rest unchallenged when students from other nations, Nicaragua for
example, are not in the classroom and cannot submit their own experience as a counterperspective.
Moreover, when educators, scientists and researchers are hampered in efforts to work collaboratively
internationally, the international impact of their work is less likely to be fully understood, or in some
cases, even considered.
Recently, struggling with these limitations, U.S. educators have renewed their call to Congress and the
administration to address this issue. The National Association of Foreign Student Advisors (NAFSA)
has called on President Bush to convene a White House conference of senior officials from the
government, higher education, and the private sector to elaborate a national strategy on international
education” (Bollag, 2004). Indeed, NAFSA is calling for a governmentwide recruitment policy for
international students, a removal of government barriers for student visas, a program of loans to assist
with tuition costs, and a central Web portal explaining the complexities of the U.S. higher education
system (Bollag, 2004). “All of our competitors have long since implemented strategies to recruit
foreign students,” according to Victor C. Johnson, associate executive director for public policy at
NAFSA. “It’s time for us to enter the race” (Bollag, 2004).
The alarming declines in applications reported by CGS member graduate schools are in areas
critical to maintaining the scientific enterprise and economic competitiveness of our country as
well as the cultural and intellectual diversity that contributes to the international renown of U.S.
graduate education. (Council of Graduate Schools [CGS] (2004), president, Debra Stewart)
For their part, the current administration claims their goal is “to remain a welcoming nation to foreign
scholars and scientists. . . “ (Schemo, 2003). In a written statement responding to the recent drop in
International students on U.S. campuses, Patricia S. Harrison, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for
educational and cultural affairs, said she was confident, “that both the situation and numbers will
improve” (Bollag, 2004). Asa Hutchinson, undersecretary for border and transportation security at the
Department of Homeland Security, said they “recognize the need for greater cooperation and were
taking steps to reduce the [visa processing] delays” (Shemo, 2003).
Even with the practical issues of visa delays aside, the prevailing negative image of the U.S. itself is a
great deterrent to students. According to Johnson of NAFSA, “The word is out on the street in China:
You can’t get a visa to study in the United States” (Bollag, 2004). Many students and their parents may
https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol3/iss1/5
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not want to risk money or time by taking a chance on the United States’ system, particularly when
other nations are so accommodating.
Conclusion
When terrorists destroyed the Twin Towers in New York, no one could have predicted all the
ramifications of such a tragic act of violence. Though the attack on a powerful symbol of American
hegemonic global dominance might have signaled a need for communication among and understanding
of other cultures, the Bush administration, engulfed in an atmosphere of fear and chaos, restricted and
increasingly isolated U.S. higher education from the rest of the world. In the shadow of these policies,
will higher education allow American hegemony to flourish? As Congress continues to struggle with
immigration issues, academia will have to fight for the continued enrollment of international students.
Scholars and students must demand access for international students, scholars and international
research collaboration. Otherwise, academic and intellectual freedom, as well as the potential for
counterperspectives, may also be destroyed.
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